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As relações Israel-Irã eram melhores nos anos 80? O que mudou?

As relações Israel-Irã eram melhores nos anos 80? O que mudou?


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Se você olhar para o caso Irã-Contra (principalmente por volta de 1985), verá que o intermediário nos braços por dinheiro / negócio de reféns eram as empresas israelenses.

As relações entre Israel e o Irã eram melhores nesse ponto? Presumo que o governo israelense soubesse desse acordo. Foi só porque, na época da Guerra Irã-Iraque, "o inimigo do meu inimigo é meu amigo"? Ao mesmo tempo, o Hezbollah já estava ativo no Líbano, então aquele pouco de irritação já existia.

O que mudou? Os palestinos são em sua maioria sunitas, não são? Portanto, não é uma facção óbvia para o Irã apoiar. E os dois países estão distantes um do outro. O que motivou a escalada da inimizade, além das ambições nucleares do Irã?


De acordo com Ronen Bergman, em seu livro A guerra secreta com o Irã, houve quatro fatores que motivaram a Operação Seashell de Israel, na qual centenas de toneladas de armas israelenses foram transportadas por via aérea ou enviadas para o Irã durante a guerra Irã-Iraque:

  • Israel sofreu perdas significativas devido à revolução de 1979 no Irã. Visto que as armas eram os meios dos governantes iranianos para manter o poder, esperava-se que o fornecimento de armas proporcionasse uma certa melhora nas relações, apesar da oposição ideológica do Irã.
  • A intensificação da guerra Irã-Iraque poderia enfraquecer os dois lados, o que era um objetivo desejável para os israelenses.
  • Israel temia profundamente a perspectiva de um Saddam Hussein vitorioso.
  • Um simples desejo de lucro, por parte da indústria de defesa.

(Eu decidi adicionar isso como um parcial responder, em vez de editar a pergunta).

Um evento significativo foi o Atentado de Amia em 1994 em Buenos Aires, Argentina, que matou mais de 80 pessoas, em um centro comunitário judaico. O irã é alegado ter se envolvido, via Hezbollah. Organizações e agentes ligados ao Hizbollah teriam assumido a responsabilidade ou sido elogiados por este ato terrorista.

Este bombardeio seguiu-se ao bombardeio anterior de 1992 da morte da embaixada israelense 30, novamente com alegações substanciais de envolvimento iraniano por meio de seus representantes do Hizbollah.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AMIA_bombing https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_attack_on_Israeli_embassy_in_Buenos_Aires


Palestra: Relações Irã-Israel

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Isso parece suficientemente elaborado para não justificar que seja considerado um esboço. Imploro-lhe que considere a remoção desta designação do artigo. eszett talk 08:02, 19 de junho de 2006 (UTC)

A Europa salvou milhares de judeus do Holocausto e que o Irã serviu como rota de fuga para os judeus iraquianos que fugiam para Israel após a guerra de 1948 pela independência de Israel. Na verdade, o Irã foi um dos primeiros países muçulmanos a estabelecer relações diplomáticas e comerciais com o Estado de Israel.

Inimigos árabes sunitas comuns tornaram persas e judeus amigos íntimos nas três décadas seguintes. O xá Mohammed Reza Pahlavi do Irã dependia de Israel para um fluxo constante de armas e inteligência. Israel dependia do Irã como parte de sua "política de periferia" de alianças de segurança com não-árabes da periferia do Oriente Médio, juntamente com a Turquia, a Etiópia e os cristãos libaneses.

O Irã persa ficou de fora de todas as três guerras árabe-israelenses e, mesmo durante o boicote árabe ao petróleo na década de 1970, continuou fornecendo petróleo a Israel. Os 100.000 judeus no Irã ajudaram a sustentar o comércio iraniano-israelense robusto.

Mesmo depois que a Revolução Islâmica do aiatolá Ruhollah Khomeini rompeu esses laços e fez com que a maioria dos judeus iranianos fugisse, a sobreposição de interesses permitiu que esses arquiinimigos fizessem negócios. A animosidade mútua em relação ao Iraque - e o desejo de Israel de preservar a influência com os moderados de Teerã - levou Israel a fornecer armas à República Islâmica até a década de 1980, incluindo o serviço como intermediário no acordo de armas por reféns do governo Reagan.

Os lampejos de uma reaproximação iraniano-israelense continuaram mesmo durante as intensas tensões da década de 1990, apesar do apoio do Irã ao Hezbollah no Líbano, aos militantes palestinos e aos atentados à embaixada israelense e ao centro cultural judaico na Argentina.

Na época de minha visita ao Irã, durante o primeiro ano da presidência reformista de Mohammad Khatami, as autoridades israelenses estavam explorando maneiras de pagar as dívidas do petróleo da era do xá com o Irã. As exportações israelenses para o Irã, principalmente equipamentos agrícolas por meio de terceiros europeus, foram estimadas em mais de US $ 300 milhões. SkyEarth

Não realizado: não está claro quais alterações você deseja fazer. Mencione as alterações específicas em um formato de "mudança de X para Y" e forneça uma fonte confiável, se apropriado. Pupsterlove02 talk • contribs 10:06, 7 de maio de 2021 (UTC)


Publicado em Revisão de Economia e Ciência Política. Publicado pela Emerald Publishing Limited. Este artigo foi publicado sob a licença Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0). Qualquer pessoa pode reproduzir, distribuir, traduzir e criar trabalhos derivados deste artigo (para fins comerciais e não comerciais), sujeito à atribuição total à publicação original e aos autores. Os termos completos desta licença podem ser vistos em http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode

A onda de protestos em massa que se espalhou pelos países árabes consecutivamente em 2011 se desenvolveu rapidamente em levantes revolucionários em grande escala que derrubaram regimes, derrubaram governantes e resultaram em mudanças substanciais na região do Oriente Médio.

Em meio a este ambiente turbulento, Israel permaneceu cético ao vento da mudança desde o início da fase revolucionária, no entanto, cauteloso quanto ao impacto que essas ondas consecutivas poderiam ter na segurança nacional de Israel. O Oriente Médio após a Primavera Árabe passou por várias mudanças profundas, desenvolvimentos rápidos e instabilidade prolongada na região geraram ações de atores externos, que posteriormente tiveram graves repercussões na segurança regional.

O crescente ativismo do Irã no Oriente Médio, após as ondas revolucionárias árabes (a Primavera Árabe), enviou ondas de choque na região do Golfo. No entanto, as preocupações com o Irã não se limitam apenas à sua estratégia de entrincheiramento declarada, mais importante, ela está centrada em suas atividades nucleares crescentes. Israel está preocupado com a presença de uma força nuclear na região que é capaz de desenvolver e eventualmente possuir armas nucleares e mísseis balísticos que colocariam em risco a segurança nacional de Israel e ameaçariam o estado de Israel. A única força viável na região, que demonstrou destreza em desenvolver ainda mais sua energia nuclear dependendo das capacidades nacionais e possuindo a tecnologia necessária, é o Irã.

O artigo examina o desenvolvimento das relações Irã-Israel em um Oriente Médio turbulento, enfocando as armas nucleares como meio de dissuasão e considerando o entrincheiramento do Irã por meio de procuradores na região e suas implicações na segurança de Israel em um status de vulnerabilidade árabe. O principal argumento é que, embora a segurança de Israel impeça o Irã de possuir armas nucleares e mísseis balísticos, a segurança de Israel é ainda mais consolidada e preservada por meio da influência prevalecente do Irã na região do Oriente Médio após a Primavera Árabe, pois mantém um status de vulnerabilidade e atraso árabe , que, por sua vez, serve à segurança nacional de Israel.

Para entender a relação oscilante entre os dois rivais, o artigo começa com um exame das relações Irã-Israel antes da revolução iraniana e aborda o desenvolvimento do relacionamento entre Israel e o Irã na fase revolucionária pós-iraniana. O artigo então fornece uma abordagem conceitual para compreender a dissuasão e o equilíbrio de poder. Em seguida, o documento delineia a competência nuclear iraniano-israelense, destacando as preocupações israelenses com relação às capacidades nucleares iranianas. O artigo então examina a opção política preferida de Israel para conter o poder nuclear do Irã, destacando a abordagem israelense após a ascensão de Donald Trump ao poder e os desenvolvimentos significativos após a revogação do acordo nuclear. O artigo termina com um exame das repercussões da influência prevalecente do Irã na região do Oriente Médio após a Primavera Árabe e aborda a dinâmica regional que consolidou ainda mais a segurança nacional de Israel.


Suporte 2 e # 8211

Esse enorme acúmulo de grandes quantidades de hardware sofisticado em um espaço de tempo tão curto obviamente precisava de pessoal qualificado para ajudar a treinar os iranianos sobre como operar e manter seus novos sistemas de armas. De fato, um tema recorrente em relatórios de imprensa da década de 1970 dizia respeito ao Irã & # 8217s relataram incapacidade de absorver tal hardware avançado em tão curto prazo. & # 8220Algumas estimativas são de que 150.000 americanos estarão no Irã em 1980, desempenhando funções relacionadas à defesa & # 8221 reclamou o senador norte-americano Dale Bumpers. " . O US General Accounting Office também concluiu que Washington & # 8220a venda extensiva & # 8221 de equipamento militar e know-how & # 8220 pode afetar adversamente o status de prontidão das forças dos Estados Unidos. & # 8221 (Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, & # 8220U.S . Fears Shah Plans Oil Takeover & # 8221, coluna Syndicated, 31 de julho de 1975).

A previsão dos pára-choques & # 8217, feita em 1977, mostra comprovadamente como a construção militar maníaca do Shah & # 8217 exigiu dezenas de milhares de empreiteiros e conselheiros militares dos EUA para sustentar. As estimativas para o número total de pessoal militar dos EUA & # 8220 incluindo conselheiros, mecânicos e pessoal de manutenção & # 8221 no final de 1973 era de apenas 1.200 (& # 8220U.S. Helping Iran Military Program & # 8221, UPI, 4 de julho de 1973 ) Com 52.000 cidadãos americanos no país por volta de 1977, o Irã era o lar da maior comunidade americana de expatriados do mundo. O Comitê de Relações Exteriores do Senado estimou que & # 8220é improvável que o Irã vá à guerra nos próximos cinco a 10 anos [& # 8230] sem o apoio dos EUA no dia a dia. & # 8221 (Ognibene, 1977) .

Não era incomum em meados da década de 1970 ter grandes quantidades de hardware e munições simplesmente & # 8220 se acumulando em docas e campos iranianos & # 8221. Como resultado disso, & # 8220, as tripulações iranianas simplesmente não podem ser treinadas com rapidez suficiente para operar todas as aeronaves que o ansioso Shah lançou sobre elas & # 8221 escreveu o jornalista Jack Anderson na época. & # 8220Eles estavam aprendendo a pilotar os F-4s quando o Xá começou a comprar os F-5Es. Antes que as tripulações do F-5E sejam quebradas, os ainda mais avançados F-14s começarão a chegar. [& # 8230] O Xá mordeu mais do que pode digerir & # 8221 uma fonte disse a Anderson, enquanto outra admitiu que & # 8220 [nós] e estamos projetando uma confusão enorme. & # 8221 (Jack Anderson, & # 8220U.S. Will Cure Iran & # 8217s Military Headache & # 8221, coluna Syndicated, 25 de setembro de 1975).

Também foi estimado em 1976 que se os EUA parassem imediatamente de vender armas ao Irã & # 8220, embora o Xá esteja considerando comprar mais 250 a 300 aviões de combate norte-americanos, além de muitos outros equipamentos & # 8212, levaria cinco anos ou mais antes que o Irã pudesse tem a experiência necessária para operar os sistemas de armas que ela já possui. & # 8221 (Tom Wicker, & # 8220President and Shah & # 8221, The New York Times, 9 de agosto de 1976).

A Grumman Corporation lançou um vídeo promocional em 1977 apresentando seus projetos no Irã, incluindo as modernas casas suburbanas dos anos 1970 construídas para seus empreiteiros no Irã e os duráveis ​​F-14s que o Irã estava começando a operar. Ele indica que a maioria dos alunos do programa tinha pouco mais do que & # 8220 ensino médio & # 8221 (veja depois de 10 & # 8242 no vídeo acima). Um instrutor mostrado no vídeo aponta que eles estavam lá para finalmente & # 8220 nos livrarmos do trabalho & # 8221 (veja após 12 & # 821729 & # 8221 no vídeo acima).

Na mesma época, o repórter James Yuenger visitou o Irã, incluindo a enorme Base Aérea de Khatami fora de Isfahan, e fez observações semelhantes às de Anderson. E está esperando comprar, & # 8221 Yuenger escreveu. Ele também citou um programador de sistemas que chegou a dizer que os Estados Unidos & # 8220estavam tentando executar programas da era espacial em uma sociedade medieval. & # 8221 (James Yeunger, & # 8220Costly war machine need Yanks para acioná-la & # 8221 , Chicago Tribune, 9 de janeiro de 1978).

No final de 1977, um dos F-14s Iran & # 8217 empacou e começou a girar. Temendo que eles não pudessem sair do avião a tempo, o piloto e seu policial de interceptação de radar no banco de trás foram ejetados, deixando o avião para cair. Um observador anônimo confidenciou a Yuenger que & # 8220 [a] depois que eles resgataram, a coisa mais maldita aconteceu: aquela aeronave saiu do estol e nivelou-se por si próprio. Os aviônicos são tão bons que não deveriam ter sido ejetados de maneira alguma. & # 8221 [Ênfase no original]. & # 8220Então o avião voou por um tempo & # 8221 ele continuou. & # 8220E então, é claro, porque o piloto saltou, ele caiu. E lá foram 25 milhões de dólares pelo tubo. Stupid! & # 8221 (Yeunger, 1978).

No ano anterior, o próprio Xá foi assistir a um teste de disparo de um míssil ar-solo AGM-65 Maverick disparado a seis milhas de distância. Em vez de atingir o alvo designado, ele deu uma volta de & # 8220 noventa graus & # 8221 e se dirigiu para o pavilhão onde o Xá e seus generais acompanhantes estavam examinando o teste atingindo o solo e explodindo nas proximidades, as ondas de choque quase derrubando a estrutura do pavilhão. Imperturbável, o Xá ordenou a retomada imediata dos testes, que foram todos um sucesso (Andrew Scott Cooper, & # 8220A Queda do Céu: Os Pahlavis e os Dias Finais do Irã Imperial & # 8221, 2 de agosto de 2016, p.30).

Teerã também empregou civis americanos para ensinar suas táticas de helicóptero militar. Delk M. Oden, major-general aposentado do Exército dos EUA, o então presidente da Bell Helicopter International montou uma força-tarefa civil de 1.500 homens & # 8220 para ajudar a criar a brigada Iran Sky Cavalry, uma força de ataque usando helicópteros e helicópteros de assalto inspirados a 1ª Divisão de Cavalaria dos EUA que lutou nas terras altas do Vietnã & # 8217s. & # 8221 O contrato para fornecer esses helicópteros, entretanto, foi feito diretamente entre a Bell Helicopter e Teerã. O Irã comprou 489 helicópteros Bell em 1973 & # 8220, mas a força-tarefa de aviador não ficou sob o controle do governo dos EUA porque nenhuma arma estava envolvida. & # 8221 (& # 8220Iran & # 8217s Army Treined by Ex-Army Aviators & # 8221, The Associated Press, 11 de fevereiro de 1975).

Além dos pilotos de helicóptero dos EUA, uma empresa de recrutamento industrial colocou um anúncio no & # 8220The Washington Post & # 8221 em 1977 buscando recrutar 20 ex-pilotos de F-14 da Marinha dos EUA para treinar pilotos iranianos. Ted Raymoud, o presidente da firma de recrutamento General Devices Inc., recebeu vários telefonemas de repórteres perguntando sobre o que se tratava. & # 8220Eles provavelmente pensaram que estávamos tentando começar uma guerra & # 8221 ele disse, continuando a enfatizar que & # 8220 [t] estes não são mercenários. Eles são estritamente para ensinar, instruir. & # 8221 (& # 8220Wanted: Some pilots for Iran & # 8221, The Philadelphia Inquirer, 11 de agosto de 1977). Qualquer piloto americano de F-14 qualificado que se inscreveu teria recebido um salário de $ 50.000 (no valor de mais de $ 200.000 hoje), além de acomodação gratuita e outros benefícios. Raymond explicou como foi difícil encontrar pessoal qualificado e também convencê-los a se mudarem para o Irã durante o programa. Viver no Irã & # 8220 é bom, desde que você possa adquirir o gosto pela comida local - arroz, cordeiro, iogurte. Mas se você quiser comprar um pote de manteiga de amendoim, ele & # 8217custará US $ 5 & # 8221, observou ele.


Os iranianos amam os israelenses Uma mensagem de esperança no "Dia Internacional de Quds"

Hoje marca o dia Quds, um dia iniciado pelo fundador da república islâmica do Irã, aiatolá Khomeini, após a revolução islâmica em 1979 para unir os muçulmanos pela oposição ao estado de Israel. Todos os anos, neste dia, massas de pessoas, lideradas por todas as frações políticas de reformistas e moderados à linha dura, se reúnem nas ruas de Teerã para pedir a aniquilação do estado judeu.

O Irã é um patrocinador estatal do Hezbollah (US $ 75 milhões ao ano), da Jihad Islâmica (US $ 70 milhões) e do Hamas (US $ 50 milhões ao ano), três grupos que visam violentamente a destruição de Israel. No entanto, uma grande parte do povo iraniano não apóia esse comportamento anti-semita. Ativistas iranianos iniciaram uma campanha no Twitter usando a hashtag #NoHateToday para condenar o dia anual de ódio e enviar uma mensagem de amor e apoio ao povo judeu e de amizade entre Irã e Israel. Uma mensagem que testemunhamos anteriormente durante as tensões sobre o programa nuclear do Irã em 2011 com as páginas do Facebook Irã ama Israel (32.632 curtidas) e Israel ama o Irã (120.912 curtidas).

Queridos amigos em todo o mundo. Junte-se a nós no #NoHateDay e escreva sobre o amor. Nos escute. Queremos paz ✌️ & # x1f1ee & # x1f1f1 ❤️ pic.twitter.com/LwxRBGyxC1

Chegará o dia em que amarraremos a verdadeira bandeira do Irã com a de Israel e alcançaremos a paz no Oriente Médio, quando o amor vencerá. # NoHateDay pic.twitter.com/jBaOqXQsA9

- Salman Sima (@SalmanSima) 23 de junho de 2017

As ações desses bravos ativistas ecoam os melhores dias nas relações Israel-Irã durante a era do Xá. Dias em que Israel e o Irã trabalharam juntos extensivamente. Milhares de israelenses viveram no Irã durante a era do Xá, onde trabalharam lado a lado para ajudar a modernizar o país e construir sistemas de irrigação avançados para os iranianos. Há alguns anos, o cineasta israelense Dan Shadur, que passou os primeiros anos de sua vida crescendo em Teerã, fez o documentário Antes da revolução sobre esta era de ouro nas relações Israel-Irã.

Mas Israel e o Irã não foram apenas estados que já tiveram boas relações, judeus e persas têm uma profunda história de unidade. Os judeus estão presentes no Irã há cerca de 2.700 anos e a comunidade é considerada uma das maiores e mais antigas comunidades judaicas do mundo. Durante o Holocausto, um diplomata iraniano servindo em Paris, Abdol Hossein Sardari, arriscou sua vida para ajudar os judeus iranianos a escapar dos nazistas. Estima-se que ele salvou milhares de vidas e foi nomeado o ‘Schindler do Irã & # 8217

Embora não seja nenhuma surpresa que o sentimento anti-semita esteja espalhado por todo o Oriente Médio, de acordo com a Liga Anti-Difamação, o Irã é o país menos anti-semita da região, com um sentimento anti-semita de 56%. Levando em consideração que o governo nos últimos 38 anos não propagou nada além de ódio aos judeus e "sionistas", podemos concluir que os aiatolás certamente não tiveram o sucesso que gostariam. Em comparação, o sentimento dos países vizinhos está em torno da marca de 80 a 90 por cento no anti-semitismo. Embora os judeus na maioria dos países do Oriente Médio tenham sido expulsos nas últimas décadas, no Irã ainda existe uma comunidade de 12 mil judeus.

A hashtag do Twitter proposta por esses jovens iranianos #NoHateDay envia a mensagem de que paz e amizade trazem esperança. Devemos apoiar esta mensagem e acolher suas intenções. O povo iraniano é nosso amigo, não nosso inimigo. O verdadeiro inimigo é o regime da República Islâmica em Teerã, que precisa de ódio e anti-semitismo para clamar pela unidade dentro de seu regime.

Irã e Israel são aliados e parceiros naturais. Um Irã democrático livre não terá melhor amigo do que Israel na região. # NoHateDay pic.twitter.com/LCKIYRvxUh
- AmirHossein Etemadi (@amiretemadi) 23 de junho de 2017

Os iranianos que estão fazendo ouvir suas vozes, e às vezes até mesmo correndo grandes riscos ao fazê-lo, merecem nosso apoio contínuo. Certamente espero que, um dia, quando os aiatolás e seus aparatos descansarem, possamos pegar um vôo direto das praias de Tel Aviv para as montanhas de Teerã para visitar nossos amigos no Irã. O atual regime islâmico deve ser visto como um hiato entre um vínculo muito mais longo entre duas nações que chega ao passado, judeus e persas.


As relações Israel-Irã eram melhores nos anos 80? O que mudou? - História

Young explica o que percebe como diferenças entre as relações raciais no Sul e as do Norte. De acordo com Young, os brancos do norte estavam mais relutantes em aceitar a mudança porque ainda tinham que enfrentar seu próprio racismo. Em última análise, Young acredita que as relações raciais foram mais lentas para mudar no Norte do que no Sul porque o Norte era segregado geograficamente, enquanto o Sul era basicamente segregado legalmente. Como os brancos do sul viveram com afro-americanos entre eles por gerações, Young acredita que os brancos do sul tinham um sentimento maior de culpa por seu racismo e discriminação racial. Como resultado, Young argumenta que muitos brancos do sul foram rápidos em apoiar o movimento dos direitos civis e amp # x2014suporte que ele acredita ter sido essencial para o sucesso do movimento dos direitos civis. Suas opiniões, aqui, oferecem uma perspectiva interessante sobre as reações dos brancos sulistas às mudanças nas relações raciais durante as décadas de 1950 e 1960 e oferece um contraponto às opiniões que enfatizam a hostilidade racial branca e a oposição visceral à dessegregação.

Sobre este trecho

Citando este trecho

Entrevista de História Oral com Andrew Young, 31 de janeiro de 1974. Entrevista A-0080. Coleção do Programa de História Oral do Sul (# 4007) na Coleção do Programa de História Oral do Sul, Coleção Histórica do Sul, Biblioteca Wilson, Universidade da Carolina do Norte em Chapel Hill.


Filha, mãe e matriarca refletem sobre raça, história e esperança

Todos nós conhecemos Martin Luther King Jr., Rosa Parks e Frederick Douglass. Mas quem são as outras grandes vozes negras do passado?

Por 18 anos, a Sociedade Cultural Afro-Americana sediou o Youth Black History Reality Show, dando às crianças e adolescentes locais a chance de pesquisar a resposta a essa pergunta e apresentar suas descobertas para um público ao vivo. Este ano, ele estará apenas online, mas a presidente do programa, Jeanette Wheeler, espera que isso possa dar ao programa um público ainda mais amplo.

Wheeler, uma ex-professora e administradora em Connecticut, é a matriarca do programa e do AACS, e ela visitou o Palm Coast Observer escritório em 15 de fevereiro para falar sobre história negra e relações raciais.

Ela trouxe amigos de duas gerações mais jovens para saber suas perspectivas: LaToya Taite-Headspeth, 42, é a registradora no Imagine School Town Center e sua filha Samira Taite-Headspeth, 16, é uma estudante na Flagler Palm Coast High School.

Programa de história negra

O que: 18º programa anual de celebração da história negra, organizado pela Sociedade Cultural Afro-Americana

Quando: 4 da tarde. Domingo, 21 de fevereiro

Onde: Online em aacspalmcoast.org. Também disponível no YouTube e Facebook.

Bolsas de estudo: Todos os anos, o programa oferece bolsas de estudo. Para doar, envie um cheque para AACS, P.O. Box 350607, Palm Coast, Florida 32135, ou doe online em aacspalmcoast.org.

O que o Youth Black History Reality Show conquistou nos últimos 18 anos?

Jeanette: Realizou uma abertura. Ele realizou conversas. Isso estimulou as mentes dos jovens e também das pessoas da comunidade sobre sua herança negra. E junto com isso, com os jovens, tem ajudado a desenvolver confiança, habilidades sociais.

LaToya: No sistema educacional, você aprende sobre Martin Luther King, Rosa Parks & mdash como, as mesmas cinco pessoas todos os anos. Nossa história não começou com a escravidão, mas é aí que os livros de história o levam continuamente. O Reality Show permite que nossos filhos desenvolvam um senso de orgulho, para que possam dizer: & ldquoWow, eu sou digno, sou o suficiente. & Rdquo

Isso faz muito mais do que apenas colocá-los no palco, mas eles também desenvolvem uma presença de palco.

Samira: No começo eu gostava de assistir porque meu irmão estava nele. Ele era Barack Obama, e eu achei tão legal: & quotMeu irmão & rsquos o presidente! & Quot

Eu sinto que isso une jovens negros. Fazer parte do programa exige que você faça pesquisas e, embora não seja o maior público do mundo, você se alimenta da energia. Requer que você aprenda.

Por que é importante para a comunidade saber que existem muitos inventores, escritores e cientistas negros ao longo da história?

LaToya: A representação é importante. Se toda a comunidade como um todo está aprendendo & mdash na escola, na mídia, em programas de TV & mdash sobre pessoas negras é escravidão, há & rsquos essa visão estreita. É importante que as influências e contribuições positivas de todas as pessoas sejam conhecidas por todas as pessoas.

Jeanette: Melhora os relacionamentos quando você percebe que cada pessoa tem o mesmo valor que você. Isso remonta ao que o Dr. King disse, o que ele sonhou para seus filhos pequenos: que as pessoas possam olhar para eles e julgá-los pelo conteúdo de seu caráter e não pela cor de sua pele.

“Nossa história não começou com a escravidão, mas é aí que os livros de história o levam continuamente. O Reality Show permite que nossos filhos desenvolvam um senso de orgulho, para que possam dizer: & # 39Uau, sou digno, sou o suficiente. & # 39 & quot

LaTOYA TAITE-HEADSPETH

Samira: Este programa ajuda você a ver o quão educados e sofisticados éramos & mdash somos. Ajuda os jovens a ler e a fazer parte dela. Meus amigos falam genuinamente sobre os papéis que desempenhamos.

Em sua vida, como as relações raciais mudaram?

Jeanette: Outras raças estão começando a ver os negros como seres humanos, que eles são capazes de desempenhar funções diferentes.

Agora, quando as pessoas no poder usam a palavra N, elas acabam pagando um preço por isso. Essa é uma coisa que podemos apreciar. Ainda temos um longo caminho a percorrer, mas estamos caminhando na direção certa.

Como podemos melhorar as relações raciais?

Jeanette: It & rsquos tem que começar com indivíduos. Você precisa ter um coração e pensar nas pessoas como seres humanos, assim como os membros de sua família.

Outra coisa: se você for uma pessoa privilegiada, você pode contratar ou doar para alguma das organizações que estão fazendo melhorias & mdash envolva-se. A AACS acolheria pessoas de outra raça, especialmente aquelas que sentem ter formas especiais de ajudar as meninas e meninos da organização.

Samira: Publicar e promover coisas positivas nas redes sociais & mdash Acho que devemos usar essas plataformas para a mudança.

Existem algumas pessoas que nunca vão mudar. Você não pode fazer nada a respeito, a não ser espalhar positividade e amor.

LaToya: Acho que houve crescimento e melhoria. Não precisamos fingir que somos iguais. O que torna todas as pessoas bonitas são as suas diferenças. Deixe & rsquos abraçar e conversar.

Como ajudaria os alunos a ver mais professores e administradores negros nas escolas?

LaToya: Você vê isso, você pode ser isso. Isso teria um impacto muito positivo.

Jeanette: Eu cresci no sul segregado: Geórgia. No mundo integrado, quando há um professor negro entrando, eu diria que o garoto negro médio dá um suspiro de alívio: “Haverá alguém que estará um pouco do meu lado. Talvez eu me sinta à vontade para compartilhar algumas de minhas experiências. & Rdquo

Como professora que também lecionava na sociedade integrada em Connecticut, tive muitos alunos negros que relutavam em falar sobre suas famílias, as coisas pelas quais estavam passando. Tivemos dias de cultura onde você deveria preparar refeições de sua cultura. Eu teria que ir falar com alguns dos estudantes negros para que eles soubessem, & ldquoIt & rsquos OK para falar sobre couve. É normal falar de frango frito, peixe frito. Outras pessoas também comem isso. & Rdquo Eles pensavam que isso acontecia apenas na cultura negra.

Samira: Indo para a aula, eu & rsquove vi muito disso acontecer com os meninos negros. Muitos atuam, mas os professores não sabem o que fazer, então eles apenas dizem, & ldquoSaia da minha classe. & Rdquo E eles estereotipam todo garoto negro como, & ldquoEste único & rsquos provavelmente está com raiva também & rdquo mas ele & rsquos não está fazendo nada.

LaToya: Se você tiver educadores representando quem está sendo educado, se isso parecer tão diverso quanto o corpo discente, haverá muito mais aprendizado acontecendo.

O que a eleição do vice-presidente Kamala Harris significou para você?

Samira: Significou muito para mim. Mas ninguém estava falando sobre isso. As pessoas estavam tweetando sobre sua roupa. Meu professor de história continuou sobre como é injusto que Trump seja acusado de impeachment.

Jeanette: Significou que estamos crescendo, que as atitudes estão começando a mudar lentamente, que minhas filhas podem agora dizer: & ldquoOi, eu também posso fazer isso. Talvez eu não queira a posição dela, mas posso querer ser um grande CEO em algum lugar, & rdquo então dá coragem para a maioria de nós que as portas estão se abrindo lentamente.

Mas uma das coisas que a maioria de nós, pessoas de cor, vimos é que a oposição [em 6 de janeiro, por exemplo, no ataque ao Capitólio dos EUA] é por causa dessas portas que se abrem para pessoas de cor. É o mesmo que dizer: membros da Ku Klux Klan & mdash que & rsquos o que todos eles são. Eles apenas têm nomes diferentes agora.

Derrotar o racismo pode parecer, às vezes, uma causa sem esperança. O que mantém você em movimento?

LaToya: É cansativo, mas sempre há esperança. Nunca é tarde demais para mudar, contanto que você tenha respiração em seu corpo. Seja aquele indivíduo. Não espere por outra pessoa. A mudança que você deseja ver no mundo & mdash deve começar com você.

Jeanette: Os escravos tinham esperança. Harrite Tubman e a Underground Railroad & mdash eles sabiam que teriam sido mortos se tivessem sido capturados, mas tinham esperança de sair dessa situação. Esse é um dos valores mais fortes das pessoas de cor. Isso é o que ensinamos a nossos filhos, quando chegam em casa chorando por serem chamados de certos nomes. Dizemos: & ldquoNão, baby. Não é realmente você que eles estão falando. & Rdquo A esperança está sempre lá.

Samira: Sempre haverá pessoas que serão contra. Mas eu realmente espero que um dia isso mude. I feel it&rsquos going to get better.

The Author: Brian McMillan

Brian McMillan has been editor of the Palm Coast Observer since it began in 2010. He was named the Journalist of the Year for weekly newspapers in North America by the Local Media Association in 2012. He lives in Palm Coast with his wife and five children. O email.


WHAT ARE THE CONTROL MECHANISMS?

As the preceding sections document, the literature has progressed from the original DV of coups and the original IV of military professionalism. Yet, while empirical and theoretical treatments of civil-military relations have progressed, the normative focus underlying the field has remained remarkably constant: How can civilians exercise better control over the military? This normative impulse begs the prior question of how civilians do exercise control over the military. Although political science has not produced the definitive answer, it has assisted the effort by cataloguing and evaluating different control mechanisms.

Civilian control techniques can be grouped into two broad categories: (uma) those that affect the ability of the military to subvert control and (b) those that affect the disposition of the military to be insubordinate (Finer 1962, Welch 1976).

The options under the first category are inherently limited. Most countries employ some sort of constitutional and administrative restraints that legally bind the military in a subservient position (Damrosch 1995). These measures, however, only restrain the military insofar as the military abides by the measures. They are legal frameworks for civilian control, but they are not really mechanisms that affect the ability of the military to subvert. In an effort to force potentially reluctant militaries to respect the legal framework, the civilian government can choose to deploy the military far from the centers of political power, as in the ancient Roman practice of garrisoning troops on the periphery of the empire. Alternatively, or in tandem, the civilian government can keep the army divided and weak relative to the civilian government. Societies that do not face grave external threats may choose to keep the regular army small in size or rely on a mobilized citizenry for defense this was the preferred option of the United States until the twentieth century. This approach is risky, however, for (depending on geography and/or technology) it may make the country vulnerable to outside threats.

Countries that face an external threat, or regimes that feel the need for large forces to preserve power, may deploy sizable armed forces but keep them divided, perhaps by setting various branches against each other or using secret police and other parallel chains of command to keep the military in check (Frazer 1994, Belkin 1998). In fact, the use of countervailing institutions such as border guards, secret police, paramilitary forces, militias, presidential guards, and so on is one of the most common forms of control, used both by autocracies (the Ottoman Empire) and democracies (Switzerland and the United States). Of course, even this effort may erode the ability of the military to execute its primary function of defending the society against external threats (Biddle & Zirkle 1996).

Welch (1976) suggests that, by developing a high degree of specialization in the army, a country may reduce the military's capacity to intervene without affecting its capacity to defend the republic. A large and highly specialized military might find it difficult to pull off a coup simply due to coordination problems. Thus, modern armed forces might be optimized for battlefield performance—each specialist performing his or her role in synchrony with the others—and yet be unable to execute a domestic power grab because all the parts would not know how to coordinate in this novel operation. Welch is correct only if the specialized military does not decide to devote training time to such power grabs. As Welch himself notes, increased functional specialization only increases the complexity of a coup plot. There is nothing inherently limiting about size or role specification that would frustrate a determined military.

Since most efforts to reduce the habilidade of the military to subvert civilian government simultaneously weaken it vis-à-vis external threats, theorists have emphasized instead efforts to reduce the military's disposição to intervene. Any military strong enough to defend civilian society is also strong enough to destroy it. It is therefore essential that the military choose not to exploit its advantage, voluntarily submitting to civilian control. Finer (1962), noting that civilian control of the military is not “natural,” argues that, given the political strengths of the military, the real puzzle is how civilians are able at all to exercise control—and the key to the puzzle, Finer says, is military disposition.

Under this category, the most prominent mechanism is the principle itself, which is variously called the “cult of obedience,” the “norm of civilian control,” or simply “professionalism” (Welch 1976, Smith 1951, Huntington 1957). Hendrickson (1988) concludes that no amount of institutional tinkering can ensure civilian control the real basis of civilian control is the ethic that governs the relationship between civilians and the military. This is what organizational theorists call nonhierarchical control (Bouchard 1991).

The necessity of focusing on the military's disposition to intervene turns the civil-military problem into what can be understood as a form of the classic principal-agent relationship, with civilian principals seeking ways to ensure that the military agents are choosing to act appropriately even though they have the ability to shirk (Feaver 1998a). To develop this norm of obedience, civilians can employ two basic techniques, which follow the traditional principal-agent pattern: efforts to minimize either the adverse selection problem or the moral hazard problem. In civil-military terms, this translates to (uma) adjusting the ascriptive characteristics of the military so that it will be populated by people inclined to obey, and (b) adjusting the incentives of the military so that, regardless of their nature, the members will prefer to obey.

Virtually all societies have used accession policy to influence ascriptive features of the military. For instance, European countries restricted military service, and especially officer commissions, to privileged castes such as the aristocracy or particular religious groups (e.g. Catholics in France). Americans adopted the mirror opposite approach, expanding military service through the militia in order to have the military reflect as much as possible the republican virtues of citizen-soldiers. 6 Different mixes of selected service, short-term universal service, and merit-based commissions are likewise effective in reducing the military's disposition to subvert civilian control by changing the character of the people that make up the military. The sociological school of civil-military relations embraces this tool and operationalizes it in terms of integrating the military with society (Larson 1974, Moskos & Wood 1988, Moskos & Butler 1996). A variant of this approach is prominent in communist and fascist countries, which have used party membership and political commissars to shape the attitudinal structure of the senior officer corps, if not the lower ranks (Kolkowicz 1966, Herspring & Volgyes 1978, Colton 1979, Herspring 1996).

There are limits to the accession tool, however. As Huntington (1957) argues, tinkering with ascriptive characteristics, an element of what he calls “subjective control,” can politicize the military such that it becomes an arena for the political struggle of the various civilian groups represented or not represented in the accession policy. Without using the term, Vagts (1937) goes into more detail on these “subjective” measures of civilian control and shows how they can politicize the military in unhealthy ways.

One way to gain some of the benefits of restrictive accession policy without the negative side effects of subjective control is through training. Thus, every recruit, regardless of social origin, is molded by careful training to adopt the characteristics desired by society—in this case, every recruit is indoctrinated with the ideal of civilian control. This approach is implicit in Huntington's (1957) emphasis on professionalism. Training is also the long pole in the civilian control tent of Janowitz (1960) and the sociological school.

Yet, there is considerable difficulty in operationalizing civilian control of the military by changing the ethic of the military. Arguably, training officers in liberal arts colleges as a complement to the official military academies constitutes an important, albeit subtle, form of civilian control. Officers so trained are likely to bring to their jobs a wider world view, certainly more “civilian” in perspective than their purely military peers. However, as opposition to ROTC programs in the United States shows, it is possible to view these programs not as instruments of civilian control but as evidence of creeping militarism in civilian society: enshrining military influence and opportunities for propaganda within the walls of the liberal (civilian) bastion (Ekirch 1956, Sherry 1995). A strong ROTC program can either be an indication of subtle civilian control over the composition of the military or weak capitulation of civilian society to an all-pervasive military value structure.

If the civilians cannot completely change the nature of the military, they can seek to adjust the military's incentives to encourage proper subordination. Some versions of this are particularly base. For instance, the Romans essentially bribed the capitol garrison to keep it out of politics. Political loyalty is similarly bought among many developing world armed forces, where substantial corruption opportunities give them a stake in the survival of the civilian regime. Guarantees of wages and benefits function much like these bribes—guarantees that, if broken, are a likely trigger for coup attempts. Bribes are very problematic as a tool of civilian control (Brooks 1998). At some level they are inherently corrupting of the military institution, and the loyalty they buy may be allegiance to the bribe, not to the civilian institution doing the bribing.

A more noble version of incentive adjustments forms the heart of traditional civil-military relations theory: a social contract between civilians and the military enshrined in a “proper” division of labor. By this division of labor, the civilians structure a set of incentives for the military that rewards subordination with autonomy. Some division of labor is inevitable indeed, the very term civil-military relations assumes that there is something called civilian and that it is different from the thing called military. However, as used here, the division of labor is more a normative than a descriptive concept. It derives from Clausewitz's (1976) principle that war is the continuation of politics by other means. This is what Clausewitz meant by the aphorism, “[War's] grammar, indeed, may be its own but not its logic.” The logic of war must come from the political masters of the military.

Clausewitzean logic assigns a role for civilians and implies, in turn, a role for the military. The military are, in Clausewitzean phraseology, the grammarians of war. This makes operations the exclusive province of the military. The argument asserts that some issues are not political that is, some issues are purely technical, best decided by the experts, in this case, the military.

This division of labor is implied in Huntington's (1957) preferred method of civilian control, “objective control.” Objective control means maximizing the professionalism of the military because obedience to civilians is at the heart of professionalism (Huntington claims), this will insure civilian control. Maximizing professionalism is best achieved by getting the military out of politics and, similarly, getting the politicians out of the military, that is, getting the politicians out of directing tactical and operational matters. Welch (1976) is even more explicit about the quid pro quo aspect of the division of labor. He advocates a hands-off approach as the most effective and achievable path to civilian control. Civilians grant autonomy to the military in matters of lesser import in exchange for military acceptance of the ethic of subordination. Such a deal was crucial, for instance, in preserving civilian control during the early French Republic the army was granted autonomy over accession policy (which the army exploited to limit commissions to the aristocracy and to Catholics) in exchange for a cult of obedience.

The disposition of the military to intervene can be reduced in yet another way—by strengthening the legitimacy of the civilian government (Holsti 1996). A vigorous and effective civilian government eliminates a powerful coup motive, namely the military conviction that they can rule better than incompetent or corrupt civilians. Such a government also makes insubordination and coups more costly because it raises the expectation that the mass civilian society will support the civilian leaders against the military. 7

Finally, civilians can adopt numerous monitoring mechanisms, which, while not making insubordination impossible, nevertheless raise the costs and so may affect the military's disposition to intervene (P Feaver, unpublished manuscript). Monitoring mechanisms include such activities as audits, investigations, rules of engagement civilian staffs with expertise and oversight responsibilities and such extragovernmental institutions as the media and defense think tanks. Essentially, monitoring mechanisms enhance civilian control by bringing military conduct to the attention of responsible civilians. Monitoring mechanisms like this presume a certain level of civilian control—they are not going to secure civilian control in the face of a coup-prone military. They are essentially the practical implementation of the constitutional/legal provisions discussed above, suffering from the same limitations. Indeed, they may even be self-limiting monitoring mechanisms can take the form of “getting in the military's knickers,” provoking more harm in military resentment than benefit they gain in civilian oversight. Properly implemented, however, monitoring mechanisms can raise the costs of military insubordination or noncompliant behavior simply by making it more difficult for such action to go unnoticed.

The greater the willingness of civilian leaders to punish noncompliant behavior, the more effective the monitoring mechanisms are in securing civilian control. Yet, even with weak and uneven punishment, the monitoring mechanisms can support civilian control. Especially in the face of a global norm supporting democratic traditions, it always costs the military more to disobey in public than to do so in private. Although monitoring mechanisms may not ensure compliance in cases where military interests dictate large benefits from noncompliance, they can affect cost-benefit calculations at the margins. More to the point, they are the critical arena for civil-military relations in mature democracies. As the norm and the fact of civilian control become more deeply entrenched, the day-to-day practice of civil-military relations (and hence the focus of the study of civil-military relations) will increasingly center on monitoring and oversight of the delegation relationship. As the field shifts in this direction, however, care should be taken to make precise and sufficiently limited claims. Conclusively establishing which monitoring mechanisms are more effective than others—or identifying the conditions under which one kind of monitoring mechanism is superior to another—is notoriously difficult. Just as it is difficult to know whether deterrence is working, the absence of civil-military problems may be evidence for the effectiveness of the control mechanism or it may reflect the underlying stability of the political structure, or luck, or indeed all three factors.


Iran’s Jewish community is the largest in the Mideast outside Israel – and feels safe and respected

TEHRAN, Iran – In a large room off a courtyard decorated in places with Islamic calligraphy and patterned tiles featuring intricate geometric shapes and patterns, men wearing tunics, cloaks and sandals recite morning prayers.

At the back of the room, three women sit together on a bench, hunched over ancient texts. Scarves cover their hair, as required by Iran&rsquos religious law. Birdsong floats into the cavernous space as the incantations grow louder and more insistent.

This is a synagogue. In Iran.

In a nation that has called for Israel to be wiped off the face of the Earth, the Iranian government allows thousands of Jews to worship in peace and continue their association with the country founded more than 2,500 years ago.

"We have all the facilities we need for our rituals, and we can say our prayers very freely. We never have any problems. I can even tell you that, in many cases, we are more respected than Muslims,&rdquo said Nejat Golshirazi, 60, rabbi of the synagogue USA TODAY visited one morning last month. "You saw for yourself we don&rsquot even have any security guards here."

At its peak in the decades before Iran&rsquos Islamic Revolution in 1979, 100,000 to 150,000 Jews lived here, according to the Tehran Jewish Committee, a group that lobbies for the interests of Iranian Jews. In the months following the fall of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Iran&rsquos second and last monarch, many fled for Israel and the United States.

It was a dispersion precipitated in part by the execution of Habib Elghanian, who was then one of Iran&rsquos leading Jewish businessmen and philanthropists. Elghanian also headed the Tehran Jewish Committee and had ties to the deposed shah. He was killed by firing squad after being accused by Iran&rsquos Islamic revolutionaries of spying and fundraising for Israel.

Few Jews remain

Today, 12,000 to 15,000 Jews remain in Iran, according to the committee.

It&rsquos a small minority in a nation of 80 million people. But consider: Iran is home to the Middle East&rsquos largest Jewish population outside Israel.

And, according to Golshirazi and other senior members of Iran&rsquos Jewish community, they mostly enjoy good relations with Iran&rsquos hard-line, theocratic government despite perceptions abroad that Iran&rsquos Islamic rulers might subject them to harsh treatment.

"The Muslim majority in Iran has accepted us," said Homayoun Sameyah Najafabadi, 53, who holds the role once held by Elghanian, chairman of the Tehran Jewish Committee.

"We are respected and trusted for our expertise and fair dealings in business, and we never feel threatened," he said. "Many years ago, before the royal regime of Pahlavi, by contrast, if it was raining in Iran, Jews were not allowed to go outside of their houses because it was believed that if a non-Muslim got wet and touched a Muslim it would make them dirty."

Najafabadi said it may be difficult for Jews and others outside the country suspicious of Iran&rsquos treatment of religious minorities or its views on Israel to accept, but after the execution of Elghanian, Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran&rsquos first supreme leader, deliberately sought to improve relations between Jews and Muslims in the country for the nation&rsquos long-term stability.

He added that Jews, who have been in Iran since about the eighth century B.C., used to be scattered all over the country but are now largely concentrated in Tehran and other big cities such as Isfahan and Shiraz. In all, he said, Iran is home to about 35 synagogues.

Najafabadi said most Jews in Iran are shopkeepers, although he said others work as doctors, engineers and in other highly skilled professions.

There are no Jews, however, in senior government positions. There&rsquos only one Jewish representative in the country&rsquos 290-member Parliament. His name is Siamak Moreh Sedgh.

Sedgh, 53, said one of the reasons Jews in Iran are able to live peacefully is that they consider themselves Iranians first &ndash and Jews second.

"We&rsquore not an entity outside of the Iranian nation. We are part of it. Our past and our future. I may pray in Hebrew, but I can only think in Persian (Farsi, Iran&rsquos language)," said Sedgh, who is also a surgeon at a hospital in central Tehran, where USA TODAY spoke with him.

Crucially, that affinity extends to the question of Israel.

"I don&rsquot think Israel is a Jewish state because not everyone in Israel lives according to the teachings of the Torah. This is what Jews in Iran believe," Sedgh insisted.

He acknowledged that it was somewhat ironic that Iran, arguably the biggest foe of Israel, was also the "biggest friend of the Jewish people."

Sounding more Iranian than Jewish, Sedgh said he disagreed with President Donald Trump&rsquos decision this year to move the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv because "Trump can&rsquot just change a capital city that according to international law and the United Nations is an occupied city."

The final status of Jerusalem has long been disputed. Palestinians want a capital of an independent Palestinian state in East Jerusalem Israel views the city as its true capital.

"Trump is a coward who has lost his humanity and forgotten about spirituality. He wants to destroy large parts of the world only for the benefit of a small group of capitalists," Sedgh said.

On Tehran&rsquos bustling streets, Jews are not very visible, partly because there are so few of them. USA TODAY did, however, spot a few men wearing kippahs as they hurried off to work in the morning. They did not appear to attract any second glances from Iranian men in business suits, others in traditional Muslim dress or women sporting hijabs and chadors.

Other minority groups in Iran include Arabs, Armenians, Baloch people (who live near Pakistan, in Iran&rsquos southeast), Christians and Kurds. Open Doors USA, an organization that tracks persecuted Christians worldwide, estimates there could be as many as 800,000 Christians secretly living in Iran. It says Christians in Iran are routinely subject to imprisonment, harassment and physical abuse for seeking to convert Muslims. USA TODAY did not encounter any Christians in Iran.

Outside the Yousef Abad Synagogue, the entrance via the courtyard was unprotected, and it was easy to walk straight in. That's unheard-of for Jews in Europe, where Jewish schools, institutions and places of worship receive extra security amid a spate of attacks.

"What you see there (for Iran&rsquos Jews) is a very vibrant community," said Lior Sternfeld, a Middle East historian at Penn State University who in November will publish a book on modern Jewish life in Iran. "A community that faces problems &ndash but it's Iran, so problems are a given."

Difficulties and discrimination

Still, rights groups and experts believe Jews in Iran do face discrimination. Najafabadi, the committee chief, conceded that in some instances, Iranian Jews have had trouble getting access to the best schools with their Muslim peers.

In other cases, treatment of Jews has ended in brutal violence.

In 1998, Ruhollah Kadkhodah Zadeh, a Jewish businessman in Iran, was hanged by the authorities after being accused of helping Iranians Jews emigrate. Two years later, 10 Jews in the southern city of Shiraz were jailed after they were accused of spying for Israel.

Then there&rsquos Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran&rsquos former president, who drew international attention when he repeatedly denied the Holocaust in which 6 million Jews were murdered.

Meir Javedanfar, an Iranian Jew, says life has improved for Jews under Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. Javedanfar left the country for Israel in 1987 as a teenager and now teaches classes on Iranian politics at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, north of Tel Aviv.

Javedanfar said, for example, that Jewish children in Iran are no longer required to attend school on the Sabbath, the traditional day of rest and religious observance among Jews that falls on a Saturday but is a regular workday in Iran.

"At the same time, the regime continues to hold Holocaust cartoon contests that are pretty anti-Semitic," he noted, referring to a provocative annual exhibition in Iran that mocks Jewish suffering while claiming to challenge Western ideas about free speech and Holocaust taboos.

He quickly pointed out: "The regime is not too concerned about its Jews as long as they don&rsquot become involved in politics and don&rsquot say anything positive about Israel."

Golshirazi the rabbi, Najafabadi of the committee and Sedgh the parliamentarian all stressed they were speaking truthfully and not trying to distort their views of life in Iran for Jews out of fear of government persecution. They also said Jews in Iran often enjoy extra social freedoms that Muslims do not, such as the ability to consume alcohol in a private setting.

The few Jews in Iran are unlikely to leave.

In 2007, the Tehran Jewish Committee rejected an offer by Israel&rsquos government to pay each family of remaining Jews in Iran up to $60,000 to help them leave the country.

"I can tell, you are thinking I am afraid," Golshirazi said when USA TODAY pressed him on that point. "But I have been many places visiting Jewish communities. Iran is the best for us."


How the Nuclear Arms Race Works

The detonation of the first nuclear bomb at the Trinity test site in New Mexico was a triumph for American scientists. For about three years, the scientists and military perso­nnel involved with the Manhattan Project had worked nonstop to build a nuclear bomb, and the blinding flash of light, intense burst of heat and deafening boom let them know they had succeeded.

Any celebrations that took place after the first detonation were short-lived. The initial goal of the secret projec­t was to build a bomb before Germany could, but World War II had officially ended in Europe on May 8, 1945, two months before the Trinity test. The decision to use the bomb on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki instead confused many. Although some believed the device saved lives by ending ground combat and air strikes, others felt Japan was ready to surrender anyway -- the Soviet Union was about to join the U.S. by declaring war on the Japanese. The Franck Committee, headed by Nobel laureate James Franck, had even issued a report suggesting the power of the nuclear bomb should be demonstrated to the Japanese before its use on military or civilian targets.

­The U.S. was equally conflicted about sharing atomic information with the Soviet Union. Many s­cientists, including Niels Bohr and Robert Oppenheimer, felt it best to allow a "free interchange of information" of atomic knowledge. Enough was known in the world of physics for the Russians to build a bomb eventually, with or without help from America. Also, withholding information might upset political ties between the two countries, both of which were coming out of World War II as major superpowers. On the other hand, a growing distrust of communism had already formed within many Americans by the end of the war, so some wanted to keep nuclear secrets out of Soviet hands. An American monopoly on nuclear weapons would make Russia more manageable from a political standpoint.

It was this kind of tension that sparked a nuclear arms race, a frantic era in which several nations tested a myriad of nuclear technology and stockpiled thousands of nuclear warheads in an effort to get ahead of one another. Like the space race, whoever had the best technology had the most power, but this was a much more dangerous game -- the potential of an all-out nuclear war between nations always loomed, and the 20th century is littered with uneasy international policies and near catastrophes.

To learn about the nuclear arms race and the people and organizations involved with it, read on.

International Nuclear Control

­I­n the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United Nations established the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in an attempt to disarm any and all nuclear weapons and establish international control on atomic information. An initial plan from the United States, informally titled the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, suggested an international "Atomic Development Authority" that would control a monopoly on weapons and information. A subsequent revision of the report called the Baruch Plan (named after its author, Bernard Baruch) was nearly the same, except it included harsh penalties for nations who violated the plan's rules.

The Soviets rejected the plan outright, arguing that the U.S. was too far ahead in weapons development and would remain so until more details for international control were worked out. Americans, according to the Soviets, would use this lead to their advantage. Russia instead suggested the complete disarmament of nuclear weapons.

Any hope of agreement was lost -- Soviet-American relations were already in sharp decline by 1946. Russian diplomats sent the U.S. State Department an unusually long telegram in February that explained a distressingly hostile policy towards America (you can read all five parts of the message here). Winston Churchill warned against communism in his famous "Iron Curtain" speech on March 5, claiming that the Soviets desired "the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines" [source: The History Guide]. Given that the Baruch Plan wasn't delivered until June of that year, a breakdown in relations between the two nations was well under way.

Soon after efforts over nuclear control crumbled, the U.S. went right back to business with testing nuclear bombs. In July, the military invited a large gathering of press members, congressmen and military officers to demonstrate a nuclear bomb's effect on large fleets of Navy ships. These tests, under the name "Operation Crossroads," were airborne and underwater attempts at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands, located in the Pacific Ocean. The first test on July 1, called Shot ABLE, performed as well as the Trinity and Nagasaki bombs, but a missed target made it less impressive. The second test on July 25, Shot BAKER, surpassed expectations. The blast destroyed or damaged 74 empty ships, shooting thousands of tons of water into the air. Worse, dangerous levels of radiation spread around the area, cancelling a third test. The display succeeded in demonstrating the power of the bomb to a much wider audience.

The Soviets, meanwhile, had known about the U.S. bomb project for a long time. German-born physicist Klaus Fuchs was among the British scientists working at Los Alamos during the Manhattan Project. Although officials didn't find out until 1948, Fuchs had been passing information about nuclear bombs to the Soviet Union since 1945. By August 1949, the Soviets detonated their own atomic bomb, nicknamed "Joe 1" by Americans after Russian leader Joseph Stalin, in Kazakhstan.

To learn about the scramble for more bombs -- and more powerful bombs -- read the next page.

The 1950s and the Hydrogen Bomb

With the Soviets successfully testing their own nuclear weapons, the race was officially on. Little more than a month after the "Joe 1" test, the United States began expanding its production of uranium and plutonium. By the start of 1950, President Harry S. Truman announced the U.S. would continue research and development on "all forms of atomic weapons."

This "all forms" part was important. Initially, scientists working for the Manhattan Project considered two possible designs for an atomic bomb. They eventually chose to create a fission bomb, in which neutrons fired toward the nuclei of uranium or plutonium set off a massive chain reaction. This type of bomb was used on Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Bikini Atoll. A physicist at Los Alamos, Edward Teller, suggested a thermonuclear fusion bomb, ou hydrogen bomb. A fusion bomb operates by forcing together deuterium and tritium, two light isotopes of hydrogen. The resulting explosion would be theoretically many times more than that of a fission device, and almost without limit. Time didn't permit the completion of a fusion bomb, but Teller pushed for a chance to complete the device in order to keep one step ahead of the Russians.

On Nov. 1, 1952, the U.S. detonated the world's first hydrogen bomb, code-named "Mike," on the Enewetak Atoll of the Marshall Islands. The resulting explosion was about the same as 10 million tons of TNT, or 700 times greater than the fission bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The cloud produced by the explosion was 25 miles high and 100 miles wide, and the island on which it exploded simply disappeared, leaving nothing but a gaping crater. Again, Klaus Fuchs had delivered early information on the hydrogen bomb designs along with the fission bomb information, and by late 1955 the Soviets tested their own design.

One of the more distressing events of the 1950s was another Soviet development -- the launch of Sputnik 1 on Oct. 4, 1957. The satellite was the first object to be launched into space by an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and the achievement caused a great scare in the U.S. If the Soviets could put a satellite into space, they could do the same thing with a nuclear warhead. Now, instead of having sufficient warning time for a nuclear attack by monitoring incoming airplanes, a missile could hit a target in less than an hour.

The 1950s also included the expansion of the nuclear "club," or the group of nations with tested nuclear weapons. England had worked together with the U.S. on the nuclear bomb design, but because of limited funds during the war, their contributions were mainly theoretical. This changed on Oct. 3, 1952, when the English tested their first nuclear bomb off the coast of Australia.

The race during the '50s started off quickly, but the real dangers didn't become evident until the next decade. To learn about nuclear weapons in the '60s, read the next page.

­The fi­rst half of the 1960s turned out to be one of the most trying eras of the nuclear arms race. Between 1960 and 1964, both France and China joined the nuclear weapons "club" by testing their own designs. The Soviets tested the most powerful bomb ever exploded, a 58-megaton atmospheric hydrogen ­bomb. As President Dwight Eisenhower left office, he warned the nation about the dangers of the military-industrial complex, a broad term that described the large network of individuals and institutions working on weapons and military technology. A growing awareness of tensions between nations, especially the United States and Russia, was only adding more heat to the Cold War. At one point, Americans were even encouraged by President Kennedy to build or buy their very own bomb shelters to avoid the dangers of a nuclear attack. People listened, and a year-long frenzy of shelter construction consumed many Americans.

One of the first major scares of the race began with the failed Baía de Porcos invasion in Cuba in April 1961. New president John F. Kennedy had approved a CIA plan to overthrow the Cuban government and replace the country's leader, Fidel Castro, with a politically friendly, non-communist government. The CIA trained a group of Cuban exiles to invade the country, but the invasion ended quickly once bombers missed targets and the invaders were either killed or captured.

This military error embarrassed Kennedy, but it led to a much more dangerous situation. The next year on Oct. 14, a U-2 bomber flying over Cuba sighted Soviet nuclear missile sites under construction, and what is known as the Cuban Missile Crisis começou. The missiles were pointed at the U.S., and a nuclear warhead could easily reach America in a short amount of time. From Oct. 16-29, the world watched as President Kennedy and Communist Party leader and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev nervously negotiated the removal of the missiles. The Soviets finally agreed to withdraw the weapons, but this marked the closest the world had come to nuclear war.

By this point, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union recognized the concept known as mutual assured destruction (MAD) -- if one country made a nuclear attack, chances were good the other would simply strike back, and the destruction of both nations would likely be the only outcome. This was the only thing that kept both nations from attacking each other, and as the '60s ended, more efforts were made toward slowing or stopping the nuclear arms race. The two rivals installed a "hot line" to facilitate discussion in the event of another close call. In July 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed in Washington, D.C., Moscow and London, with the aim of preventing any nation without nuclear weapons from acquiring them. The first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) between the U.S. and Soviet Union also began in Helsinki, Finland, in November 1969, and the world was on its way toward a nuclear détente, a relaxing of tensions and attempt at understanding.

To learn more about détente during the 1970s, read the next page.

The SALT I sessions continued in the early '70s, and by May 1972 President Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed a series of treaties, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The limitation of ABMs became an important step -- although they were defense systems, an excess of anti-ballistic missiles actually encouraged offense. If one country knew it had a better chance of stopping attacks than the other, it would have less to lose in a nuclear war. With the ABM Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to maintain just two ABM sites each.

Despite perceived improvements in international relations, everything wasn't exactly rosy. A U.S. development in nuclear weapon technology during this era was multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) -- single missiles that could target multiple cities with several nuclear warheads. MIRVs could easily overcome a limited defense system comprised of only two ABMs. The ABM Treaty never addressed this innovation, and during the '70s America and the Soviets would add more than 12,000 nuclear weapons to their stocks.

­By th­e end of the '70s, tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union began to rise once again. A second series of talks ended in 1979 with the signing of the SALT II treaty, which recognized MIRVs and set limits on the number of weapons a country could have and the rate at which technology could move forward. President Jimmy Carter, who originally signed the treaty, pulled out of the agreement in January 1980 when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, setting the stage for the next difficult decade.

The decade also ended with a scare when the nuclear power plant at Three Mile Island suffered a partial meltdown in 1979. The accident, located near Harrisburg, Penn., caused 140,000 residents to flee the ­area upon hearing news of the first major nuclear power accident. No one was injured or killed during the accident, but the event heightened fears of nuclear power and increased the need for safety regulations.

Alongside the attempt at détente, two more countries joined the nuclear "club" in the '70s. India unexpectedly began testing nuclear technology in 1974 -- an underground test on May 18, known as "Smiling Buddha," wasn't a weapon suitable for warfare, and Indian officials declared the trials "peaceful." The test still received negative international attention as yet another country emerged with nuclear capabilities, and the action prompted Pakistan, India's longtime rival, to respond with their tests soon after.

The Nuclear Arms Race, 1980 to Present Day

With the election of President Ronald Reagan in 1981, military spending became a top priority for the United States. Cold War rhetoric increased dramatically, as the Soviet Union was referred to as an "evil empire" by Reagan. In 1983, the president proposed a new, extremely expensive space-based anti-ballistic missile system called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Also known as "Star Wars," the plan hoped to design a complex anti-ballistic missile system that used technology on the ground and satellites in space to defend the U.S. from airborne nuclear attacks.

T­he controversial program was eventually­ abandoned because it was too complicated and expensive -- after the U.S. spent more than $80 billion, barely any progress was made on the "Star Wars" plan, and many critics pointed out that its science-fiction-based name was appropriate for a system that might never come to fruition. Despite this, the Americans were still far ahead of the Soviets in technology and funds, and Mikhail Gorbachev, Russia's leader at the time, was pushing more for peace and restructuring. As Soviet-American relations began to improve by the late '80s, the Soviet economy was on the verge of a collapse. On Nov. 9, the Berlin Wall fell, finally uniting East and West Germany. The wall was a longtime symbol of the tensions between the Soviets and the U.S., and the Cold War effectively ended two years later when the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

The '90s began with a sense of relief and the feeling that the threat of nuclear war had weakened. o Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) was quickly reintroduced for consideration -- the plan had begun during the Reagan administration, but disagreements led to a standstill on its ratification. Presidents George H.W. Bush and Gorbachev signed the treaty with pens made from melted-down nuclear missiles, as it called for the reduction of nearly 50 percent of each country's nuclear arsenal.­

­Although nations made gradual improvements after the Cold War to­ward disarm­ament, complications continued to emerge during the '90s and into the 21st century. Nations including China and India continued to test weapons on and off despite a general movement toward the end of such acts. Although there are seven nations with an acknowledged arsenal of nuclear weapons - the U.S., Russia, Britain, France, China, India and Pakistan -- other nations are suspected to have nuclear programs or have actively pursued weapons. Israel, Iran, North Korea and Libya are all believed to have extensive knowledge or capabilities of producing nukes, which still manages to cause political tensions and international uncertainty.

For lots more information on nuclear weapons and related topics, see the next page.


Assista o vídeo: CAŁA PRAWDA O IZRAELU Historia konfliktu i mało znane ciekawostki (Julho 2022).


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  1. Gardak

    Não é o seu problema!



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